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Local Responses to Federal Grants:
Evidence from the Introduction of Title I in the South†
By Elizabeth U. Cascio, Nora Gordon, and Sarah Reber*
We analyze the effects of the introduction of Title I of the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a large federal grants
program designed to increase poor students’ educational services
and achievement. We focus on the South, the poorest region of the
country. Title I increased school spending by $0.50 on the dollar in
the average southern school district and by more in districts with less
ability to offset grants through local tax reductions. Title I-induced
increases in school budgets appear to have reduced high school
dropout rates of whites, but not blacks. (JEL H52, H75, I21, I28, J15)

I

ntergovernmental grants are widely used tools that may preserve the efficiency
benefits associated with local provision of public goods, while addressing equity
concerns and cross-jurisdictional externalities (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972, 1999).
But local control may undermine the intent of the granting government. Receiving
jurisdictions may crowd out intergovernmental grants by reducing their own fiscal
effort, treating the grant as they would any other source of income. And even when
grants increase spending, those dollars may be allocated in unintended or ineffective ways. Understanding local responses to intergovernmental grants is important.
For example, state and local governments in the United States received over $500
billion—22 percent of their total revenue—from federal aid in 2009 (Barnett 2011).
Intergovernmental grants are particularly salient in US school finance. Over the
past 50 years, both the federal government and the states have dramatically changed
the level and distribution of education grants across school districts in an effort to
narrow gaps in school spending and achievement. A large empirical literature has
explored the effects of changes in state school finance regimes on school spending
(e.g., Fisher and Papke 2000; Hoxby 2001). A separate literature has examined how
the dramatic increase in school spending over recent decades has affected student
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outcomes (see Hanushek 1997 for a review). Few studies have examined the effects
of intergovernmental grants on school spending and student outcomes simultaneously, or using variation from their policy origins.1
We do so in this paper, analyzing how Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) affected school spending and high school dropout rates in the years immediately following its introduction.2 Title I was—and
continues to be—the largest federal program for elementary and secondary education, providing funds to support supplemental educational programs for poor children. The South was allocated large Title I grants at the program’s introduction
due to its high poverty rate, and serves as the focus of our analysis in part for
this reason. The South is also of historical interest, given the vast racial inequities
in school resources and educational attainment that developed in the region after
Reconstruction (Margo 1990; Card and Krueger 1992a, 1996; Ashenfelter, Collins,
and Yoon 2006), and its low school spending and poor educational outcomes by
national standards, even for whites.
We begin by estimating the impact of the introduction of Title I on school
spending. Existing studies of Title I (Feldstein 1978; Gordon 2004) analyze marginal changes in grant amounts under the existing program, whereas we estimate
responses to the larger changes in funding generated by the program’s introduction.
Our research design combines the timing of the program’s introduction with variation across school districts in its intensity, which was increasing in a district’s 1960
child poverty rate. Simply put, we test whether the sharp increase in progressivity of
federal school revenue in the mid-1960s arising from Title I was accompanied by an
increase in the progressivity of school spending. Thus, we determine whether Title I
grants exhibited “flypaper effects” by “sticking where they hit” (Hines and Thaler
1995), or were crowded out by state and local governments, as would have been
predicted by a neoclassical model in which local governments were accountable to
rational median voters.
The main threat to identification in our empirical strategy comes from school
desegregation, in two respects. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) made
receipt of Title I funds contingent on meeting desegregation guidelines, and in previous work, we have shown that school districts responded to this financial incentive
in the mid-1960s by desegregating just enough to receive their grants (Cascio et al.
2010). If this desegregation affected spending, our approach would still identify
a reduced-form effect of Title I on spending, but desegregation would be a causal
mechanism. The desegregation requirements for CRA compliance at this time were
minimal,3 however, and their small impact on the overall racial balance of southern
1
Card and Payne (2002) examine how changes in the progressivity of school spending induced by state school
finance reforms changed the distribution of SAT scores by income at the school district level. A related literature
looks at effects of school finance reforms on local spending and outcomes within individual states: see Clark (2003)
on Kentucky, Guryan (2001) on Massachusetts, and Papke (2005, 2008) and Roy (2011) on Michigan.
2
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature on the effects of the introduction of other “War on Poverty”
programs, including Medicare (Almond, Chay, and Greenstone 2006; Finkelstein 2007), Head Start (Ludwig and
Miller 2007), and the Food Stamp program (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009; Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach
2011).
3
In 1966, for example, the financial incentive induced districts to move 2 to 6 percent of blacks into schools with
whites (Cascio et al. 2010). See Cascio et al. (2008) for more on the timing of southern desegregation.
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schools (Cascio et al. 2010) was unlikely to have increased the demand for school
spending, as did the more intensive desegregation efforts in the following years
(Reber 2011; Johnson 2011). To mitigate concerns that this desegregation affected
spending nevertheless, we focus our main analysis on changes in school spending
from 1964 to 1969. President Nixon stopped enforcing the fund-withholding provisions of the CRA when he entered office in 1969, and at the end of the 1960s, schools
in poorer districts were no more racially balanced than schools in richer districts—a
finding of previous research (Cascio et al. 2008, 2010) that we reproduce below.
Second, as Nixon backed off CRA enforcement, the federal courts stepped up
their efforts, and districts across the South desegregated substantially between 1968
and 1970 (Cascio et al. 2008). If desegregation increased demand for school spending more in poorer districts, we might mistakenly attribute desegregation-related
increases in spending to the introduction of Title I. Indeed, poorer districts tended to
have higher black enrollment shares. Districts with higher black enrollment shares,
in turn, historically had larger gaps in spending between separate black and white
schools, and thereby required larger spending increases to maintain spending on
whites when black and white schools combined (Reber 2011). We therefore control
linearly for the 1960 black enrollment share in all of our models and confirm that the
results are not sensitive to alternative functional forms.
Using newly collected data, we estimate that the introduction of Title I increased
school spending by $0.50 on the dollar in the average southern school district, more
than double what would have been predicted in a neoclassical model of local government behavior. Title I crowded out local revenue, not state aid. The findings are
robust to the inclusion of a range of controls beyond black enrollment share. Further,
changes in the relationship between child poverty and fiscal outcomes were closely
timed with program implementation, and there was little change in these relationships in the years leading up to it, suggesting that we have identified the causal
impact of Title I’s introduction. Title I appears to have had larger than predicted
spending impacts on average because it increased school spending significantly
more in districts where the Title I grant was large relative to what local revenue
would have been had pre-ESEA trends continued—districts with what we term “low
scope” to offset the grants through reductions in local taxes. Changes in desegregation did not vary along this margin, further diminishing the concern that desegregation is driving the results.
The heterogeneous spending response informs our analysis of Title I-induced
spending increases on student outcomes. We ask whether the gap in high school
dropout rates between poorer and richer school districts closed by more in districts
where Title I funds actually increased spending (those with low scope to offset Title I
funds) than in other southern districts. We find that, for whites, each additional $100
of Title I-induced current expenditure per pupil (real 2009 US dollars) received in
1969 (corresponding to about that much per year from 1965 to 1969) was associated
with a decrease in high school dropout rates at ages 18 and 19 of about 3.5 percentage points. For blacks, by contrast, the estimates are statistically insignificant and
precise enough to rule out effects as large as those found for whites. These estimates
are necessarily more speculative than those of the effects of Title I on school spending, because the lack of high frequency data limits the specification checks at our
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d isposal. Nevertheless, our findings are robust to additional controls and falsification exercises conducted on unaffected cohorts.
Our findings for educational attainment may provide indirect evidence that
Title I-induced spending increases were not allocated as the federal government
intended. There was little to prevent school districts from directing them to schools
attended by whites, which remained largely separate in the South over the period
of study. All states in our sample stopped reporting district-level data on spending
by race by 1965, and they never reported school-level budgetary data, so we cannot examine this hypothesis directly. However, Martin and McClure (1969) provide
extensive anecdotal evidence of such reallocations of Title I funds, which are consistent with longer standing practices in the South of diverting school revenue from
black to white students (Margo 1990).
Though Title I had larger than expected spending effects in the South, the relatively weak regulations in place at the time gave school boards considerable latitude
over how to allocate the additional education spending across students. Policymakers
today continue to grapple with the question of how to optimally regulate Title I—
and a host of intergovernmental grant programs across policy functions—with the
goal of preventing crowd-out and misuse of funds while retaining local governments’ ability to optimally allocate resources. Our analysis contributes to a growing
literature suggesting that the answer depends on local institutional context.
I. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act

In January 1965, President Johnson declared a “national goal of full educational
opportunity,” expanding the “War on Poverty” to include education. Three months
later, following decades of unsuccessful efforts to expand the federal role in education, the ESEA was signed into law.4 Title I was by far the largest component of
the ESEA, authorizing $7 billion (real 2009 US dollars) in new federal funding for
programs for poor children and doubling the federal commitment to K–12 education. Title I was reauthorized as the No Child Left Behind Act in 2001 and remains
the largest federal program for K–12 education today.
The program marked a historic shift in federal education policy, not only for its
magnitude, but also for the control it exerted over schools. The Johnson administration used Title I funds as a “carrot” to encourage school desegregation in the
South, by enforcing the requirement of nondiscrimination in federally funded programs under Title VI of the 1964 CRA. Cascio et al. (2010) show that the financial
incentives were sufficiently powerful to prompt southern districts to meet the quite
limited definition of nondiscrimination enforced in 1965 and 1966—the transfer of
a small share of blacks to white schools. Our focus here is on how the additional
income provided by the grants affected school spending and high school dropout in
the South as of the late 1960s, when Title I funds were no longer being withheld on
the basis of insufficient desegregation.

4
While many education historians have focused on the “three Rs” (race, religion, and “Reds”), Kaestle (2001)
also attributes previous policy failures to a lack of strong presidential leadership.
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The initial formula amounts, allocated to counties for the 1965–1966 school year,
were linear in county resident “eligibles”—5–17-year-olds in low-income families
as of the 1960 census, plus a small number of children in higher income families
that received AFDC in 1962.5 The slope of the funding formula (the “state factor”)
initially reflected state efforts, with each eligible child allocated one-half of average
education spending per pupil in the state two years prior (net of federal transfers). In
1967, the state factor applied in states spending below the national average (including all of the states in our sample except Florida) was leveled up to the national
average (US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 1969). Child
poverty was thus essentially the sole determinant of Title I formula amounts for
southern counties after 1967.6
Throughout the period, states used available subcounty data on child poverty to
divide formula grants across school districts within counties. We use the amount
each district was entitled to according to these divisions in 1965 (not the amount
they actually received) to estimate the number of Title I eligible children in each
district, based on data from US Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
Subcommittee on Education (1965, 1967). Our key independent variable—the child
poverty rate used to determine a district’s Title I entitlement—is this estimate of the
number of district eligibles (based mostly on 1960 child poverty counts) divided by
district enrollment in 1960. (See online Appendix A for details.)
The influx of Title I funds to the South was sizeable. Figure 1 shows trends in
average per-pupil current educational expenditure and revenues by source for southern school districts between 1961 and 1969. The underlying sample, which forms
the basis of the analysis to follow, includes most school districts in the nine of the
eleven states of the former Confederacy (the “South”) where annual school finance
and enrollment data were available in print publications.7 As shown in Table 1, federal revenue was negligible in the South prior to passage of the ESEA, accounting
for about 3.4 percent of per-pupil current expenditure in 1964, but represented 17.2
percent of per-pupil current expenditure by the end of the decade. Title I accounted
for only 8 percent of spending nationally at this point (Snyder and Dillow 2011).

5
Other categories of eligibility were added over time, but a county’s eligibility by the end of the 1960s remained
determined mostly on the basis of the 1960 census child poverty counts. Cohen and Moffitt (2009) emphasize the
role of the Title I formula itself in garnering political support by spreading funds across Congressional districts
rather than concentrating them more intensively in high poverty areas.
6
Cascio et al. (2010) exploit variation in Title I formula amounts in 1966 across states (from variation in the
state factor) as well as across districts (from variation in child poverty). We cannot use this approach due to the
change in the formula.
7
These states are Alabama (Alabama Department of Education 1961–1970), Florida (Florida State
Commissioner of Education 1969, 1970, 1971; Florida State Superintendent of Public Instruction 1963, 1965,
1967), Georgia (Georgia Department of Education; Georgia State Department of Education 1967, 1969),
Louisiana (State Department of Education of Louisiana 1961–1970), Mississippi (Mississippi State Department
of Education 1961, 1963, 1966, 1968; Mississippi State Superintendent of Public Education 1971), North Carolina
(North Carolina Education Association 1963–1968; North Carolina Department of Public Instruction 1965–
1970), South Carolina (South Carolina State Department of Education 1961–1967; South Carolina Department
of Education 1968–1970), Tennessee (Tennessee Department of Education 1961–1970), and Virginia (Virginia
State Board of Education 1961–1970). Arkansas did not include ESEA funds in its expenditure or revenue data;
Texas did not publish the relevant school finance data for this period. We cannot use the Census of Governments
for this analysis since it is available only every five years and, critically, includes Title I funds in state, rather than
federal, revenue. See online Appendix A for further description of the data and estimation sample.
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Figure 1. Trends in Per-Pupil Expenditure and Revenue by Source: Southern States, the 1960s
Notes: All figures are in real 2009 US dollars. Sample consists of 910 school districts from nine southern states:
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. See
online Appendix A for description of estimation sample. Means are weighted.

Table 1—Descriptive Statistics on District Revenue and Expenditure
Level

Per-pupil federal
revenue
Per-pupil state
revenue
Per-pupil local
revenue
Per-pupil current
expenditure

1961
(1)

47.90
(62.62)
1,187.03
(351.72)
448.88
(341.59)
1,675.67
(451.70)

1964
(2)

65.12
(73.49)
1,318.43
(351.79)
509.44
(392.08)
1,905.66
(464.14)

Change
1969
(3)

486.72
(262.51)
1,803.55
(428.93)
835.63
(586.08)
2,825.19
(511.85)

1961 to 1964
(4)
17.22
(35.06)
131.40
(94.99)
60.56
(114.57)
229.99
(215.31)

1964 to 1969
(5)
421.60
(270.20)
485.11
(231.73)
326.19
(286.14)
919.53
(420.69)

Notes: All figures are in real 2009 US dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Sample
consists of 910 school districts in nine southern states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. See online Appendix A
for description of estimation sample. Means are weighted.

Title I funds were intended to provide supplemental programs to “educationally
deprived” poor children, with the goal of raising achievement. However, Title I’s
early regulation and enforcement did not ensure that the program would translate
into more school spending, let alone increased compensatory services. Regulations
specified only that Title I funds should “supplement not supplant” local revenues.
While HEW conducted district-level audits, it did not require districts to return funds
that were misused or penalize districts for violations. The program was criticized
as a fungible supplement to general revenue as opposed to a targeted and defined
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compensatory intervention, most influentially in a 1969 report by the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (Martin and McClure 1969). Such criticisms sparked a series of
changes to Title I in the 1969 amendments to the ESEA that are still embedded in the
system today (Brown 2011; Cohen and Moffitt 2009).8 However, even today’s complex regulations and serious enforcement cannot prevent districts from appropriating Title I funds, either for private consumption or for other educational purposes.9
We therefore consider Title I to be a restricted block grant to a school district,10
where spending on public education is the “targeted good.” We begin our analysis
with an examination of the effects of the program’s introduction on education spending at the district level. We then turn to an analysis of its impacts on student outcomes. In light of the above discussion, we consider the impacts of Title I-induced
spending increases for all students, not just Title I eligible students. However, we
present estimates separately by race to provide indirect evidence on within-district
allocation of funds. While blacks should have benefited more from Title I-induced
spending increases given their relative poverty, blacks and whites in the South
largely attended separate schools through 1968 (Cascio et al. 2008), providing sufficient scope for funds to be diverted from blacks to whites as had been the practice
in the South for most of the twentieth century (Margo 1990).
II. Theoretical Background

How much Title I translated into higher school spending depends on how much
lower levels of government—both local school districts and states—offset Title I
grants by reducing their own contributions for education. A significant empirical
literature finds that grants increase spending on the targeted good more than would
be expected from a neoclassical model, suggesting that crowd-out might not be a
major impediment to redistribution through intergovernmental grants. More recent
literature has demonstrated that some of these “flypaper effects” are simply statistical artifacts generated by omitted determinants of grant size, such as local preferences (Knight 2002; Gordon 2004). Other recent papers suggest local institutions
play a key role in determining the incidence of intergovernmental grants (Baicker
and Staiger 2005; Brooks and Phillips 2010; Lutz 2010; Strumpf 1998).
We also find a role for local institutions in mediating fiscal responses to Title I
grants. An important feature of 1960s southern school finance was the small share
of total revenue raised locally compared to the rest of the country. This meant that
Title I grants were often large relative to local revenue, limiting the ability of some
8

The “supplement not supplant” principle moved from regulations into the law itself, with annual reporting
required beginning in July of 1971. Two new provisions aimed to prevent Title I funds from being used as substitutes for state and local funds: “comparability,” which requires equitable allocation of state and local resources
across schools within districts, and “maintenance of effort,” which withholds Title I funds if state and local revenues
per pupil fall beneath a (time-varying and often 100 percent) share of previous levels.
9
Gordon (2004) shows that maintenance of effort requirements did not prevent Title I from crowding out local
revenue in the 1990s, and van der Klaauw (2008), Roza (2010), and Heuer and Stullich (2011) show that the comparability provision does not ensure that Title I funds are concentrated in the poorest of a district’s schools.
10
While school districts in the South and elsewhere in the US are often coincident with other local jurisdictions such as counties or cities, they are usually governed by their own elected or appointed school boards. In three
states in our sample (North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia), school districts are “dependent” on city and county
governments for revenue.
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Figure 2. Local Government Responses to Title I Grant

districts to reduce local taxes in response to receiving Title I funds. Local revenue
was only 27 percent of the typical southern district’s total revenue in the early 1960s,
and per-pupil federal revenue in 1969 was almost as large in real terms (Table 1).
Incorporating these features of southern school finance, Figure 2 illustrates the
standard neoclassical choice problem for a school district before and after Title I.11
The innermost budget constraint (BC1) shows the pure local finance case where
prices are normalized to one and the district can allocate total income I freely
between educational services (E) and all other goods (C), including private consumption. BC2 accounts for state aid and the minimum local contribution (a legally
mandated amount districts must raise locally) with a parallel shift of the budget
constraint, and represents the scenario before Title I.12 A district had to spend at
least as much as the state grant plus the minimum local contribution on education,
so maximum spending on C was I less the minimum local contribution; the dashed
part of the budget constraint was inaccessible. The introduction of Title I caused a
further parallel shift in the budget constraint to BC3.13 After Title I, the district had

11
The median voter in the South would have been white, and southern school boards would have been controlled by whites throughout this period in most or all of the districts in our sample (US Commission on Civil Rights
1968). For simplicity, we do not incorporate race into the model explicitly.
12
Upwards of 80 percent of state aid was distributed through so-called “minimum foundation programs”
(MFPs). Grants under state MFPs were not pure block grants in the sense that some district choices (e.g., the distribution of teacher experience) could affect the amount of the grant. We abstract from these issues here, since they
likely had small effects and in any case are unrelated to the Title I grant.
13
Because we focus our empirical analysis on district behavior in 1969, at which point the funds were no longer
conditional on desegregation, we abstract from the conditional nature of Title I funds. That is, we do not present
segregation as a good consumed by voters, as in Cascio et al. (2010). We also abstract from any possible general
equilibrium effects of the program’s introduction, in particular on teacher compensation. To the extent that the
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to spend at least as much as previously required plus the Title I grant on education;
the dashed part of the new budget constraint was inaccessible.
How much should have the introduction of Title I increased school spending?
Assuming no change in state aid, a given school district would have liked to increase
its spending on both E and C according to the relevant income elasticities, in which
case its increase in E would have been less than the size of the grant. If its optimal
bundle was on the inaccessible (dashed) portion of the budget constraint, however,
it would have been forced to the corner (point Z), increasing E by more. The figure
illustrates an extreme case where spending increased dollar-for-dollar with Title I:
the district at the corner before Title I (point X) would have liked to move to point
Y on BC3, but was restricted to choose the new corner, Z. More generally, minimum
local contributions and significant state aid in the South would have increased the
chances that a district was constrained and increased E more than expected given the
income elasticity of demand for education.
In a more realistic model incorporating a probability of detection, fixed costs of
changing tax rates, or uncertainty about revenues and expenses, a district would not
have needed to be at a corner to have been constrained to spend more on education
than desired. While we cannot observe the constraints specific to each school district, we expect that crowd-out would have been more difficult where the grant was
large relative to local revenue. Below, we test this idea by estimating heterogeneity
in fiscal responsiveness to Title I depending on the magnitude of a district’s grant
relative to an estimate of what its local revenue would have been in the absence of
the program.
State governments might also have offset the new federal funding. The objective
function of a state government is more complicated than that of a school district
due to its additional policy functions beyond education, and we do not explicitly
model its decision here. We can say, however, how a state government would have
responded had it wished to replicate the pre-Title I distribution of total (state plus
federal) aid across districts after Title I: it would have reduced aid on average, to
offset the increase in federal grants for the average district, and reduced aid more for
poorer districts, which received larger Title I grants.14
Our empirical strategy allows for identification only of the latter type of
response—changes to the progressivity of state aid. More generally, our approach
focuses on whether the sharp increase in the progressivity of federal education aid
in 1965 coincided with a reduction in the school spending gap between poorer and
richer districts, with corresponding changes in the poverty gaps in local and state
revenue revealing the level of government responsible for any crowd-out.

introduction of Title I increased teacher salaries (by increasing the demand for teachers), any increase in overall
school spending at the district level would have procured a lesser increase in educational services.
14
The poverty rate did not directly enter the funding formula in any state under investigation; thus, it might
appear difficult for states to change the progressivity of funding without undertaking a major reform. However, the
formulas were complex, with inputs that may have been correlated with poverty rates. Reber (2011) shows that the
state of Louisiana was able to redistribute state aid substantially in response to desegregation (directing additional
funding to districts with higher black enrollment shares) by subtly manipulating the parameters of the existing
school finance program.
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III. Fiscal Reponses to the Introduction of Title I

A. Graphical Evidence
Recall that Title I funds were initially allocated by a linear rule: the formula
assigned a constant amount for each Title I eligible student. Title I eligibility was
determined primarily based on the number of 5–17-year-olds with family income
below $2,000 in the 1960 census. A straightforward way to think about the school
spending impacts of Title I’s introduction is therefore to explore how the spending
gradient in the “initial” district child poverty rate, defined using these eligibility
counts, changed over the 1960s, controlling for black enrollment share to account
for any contemporaneous impacts of desegregation on school spending (Reber 2011;
Johnson 2011), as earlier described. If Title I increased school spending, spending
should have become more progressive around 1965. The identifying assumption
is that if the Title I program had not been introduced, there would not have been a
break in the poverty gradient as of 1965.
We thus begin by estimating parsimonious regressions of per-pupil spending and
revenue on the child poverty rate, separately by year (t), controlling for district black
enrollment share and state (s) fixed effects:
(1)	
yd st  = γst  + θt  child_ povertyd   + βt  blackd   + ε dst  .
Initial district child poverty (child_ povertyd ) is defined as the ratio of district d’s
Title I eligibility count in 1965, constructed as described in Section I (and online
Appendix A), to its 1960 enrollment. Table 2 shows the average southern district
had a child poverty rate of 32 percent and a 1960 black enrollment share (blackd )
also of 32 percent.15 The state-year fixed effects, γst   , account for state-specific
shocks. The regressions give each district equal weight, so as to capture the average
southern school district’s fiscal response to Title I; the fiscal responses implied by
enrollment weighted estimates are similar.
The circles in Figure 3 show how estimates of θt  , the child poverty gradient,
evolved over time for per-pupil fiscal outcomes, measured in the fall of the year
specified and in real 2009 US dollars. Panel A shows that the estimated poverty gradient in per-pupil federal revenue was little changed in the early 1960s but increased
sharply in 1965, the first year in which Title I funds were distributed.16 The estimates for per-pupil current expenditure, shown in panel B, follow the same pattern:
the progressivity of school spending trended little in the early 1960s but increased
after 1964, suggesting that Title I narrowed the gap in school spending between
richer and poorer districts in the South. However, Title I funds did not translate
15
For all states except North Carolina, we constructed this variable from data reported in the school finance
publications cited in footnote 7. For North Carolina, we estimated this variable using data from Southern Education
Reporting Service (1964, 1966).
16
Though the two substantive federal grants programs in the early 1960s, Aid to Federally Impacted Areas and
the National Defense Education Act, did not explicitly distribute funds based on poverty, the relationship between
poverty and federal aid is slightly negative prior to the ESEA. For our identification strategy, the critical finding is
that the trend in this relationship is flat prior to the ESEA.
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Table 2—Descriptive Statistics on District Characteristics
Mean
(1)

Child poverty rate, 1960
State factor in Title I grant, 1969
Black enrollment share, 1960
District enrollment, 1960
One of poorest 300 counties, 1960 (=1)
Percent voting for Thurmond, 1948
Black voter registration rate, early 1960s (percent)
Black/white dissimilarity index, 1970

0.32
954
0.32
6,938
0.24
34
28
0.28

SD
(2)

0.17
6.09
0.22
11,869
0.43
30
24
0.22

Observations
(3)
910
910
910
910
910
910
812
853

Notes: The state factor in the Title I grant is expressed in real 2009 US dollars. Sample consists
of school districts in nine southern states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. See online Appendix A for description of estimation sample.
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Figure 3. Year-by-Year Gradients of District Finance Variables in the 1960 Child Poverty Rate
Notes: All figures are in real 2009 US dollars. The solid dots represent the coefficients on the 1960 district child
poverty rate from (unweighted) year-specific regressions that also include state dummies and the 1960 district black
enrollment share (equation (1)). The capped lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals on the estimated difference between the poverty gradient in a given year and its value in 1964. To obtain these confidence intervals,
we pooled data from 1961 to 1969 and regressed fiscal outcomes on district dummies, state-by-year dummies, and
interactions of the 1960 child poverty rate and 1960 black enrollment share with year dummies (for all years except
1964), clustering standard errors on county. The confidence intervals shown are those for the coefficients on the
final set of interaction terms, rescaled by the estimate of the 1964 poverty gradient from equation (1). See footnote 17 for more details.

d ollar-for-dollar into higher spending: the increase in the poverty gradient for perpupil current expenditure was less than that for per-pupil federal funding. The poverty gradient in local revenue became more negative after 1965, suggesting that
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local effort may have declined in response to Title I, but the moderate progressivity
of state aid did not change (panels C and D).
The capped vertical lines around the circles in Figure 3 represent 95 percent confidence intervals on the estimated difference in the poverty gradient between the
year specified and 1964.17 For per-pupil federal revenue, current expenditure, and
local revenue, the gradient in child poverty is statistically distinguishable from its
1964 value for each year between 1965 and 1969, but there were neither substantive
nor statistically significant changes in the child poverty gradient for state revenue
in post-ESEA years. For all variables except local revenue, the differences in the
poverty gradients in pre-ESEA years are not just insignificant economically, but also
statistically: we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the progressivity of school
spending, federal revenue, or state revenue was unchanged across the early 1960s.
For per-pupil local revenue, we do reject equality with the 1964 poverty gradient in
1961 and 1963 (in the latter case marginally so), but the differences in the gradients
are small relative to the differences seen in the post-ESEA period. This suggests that
unobserved determinants of school finance were not meaningfully correlated with
child poverty—and the intensity of the Title I program—in the years leading up to
Title I implementation, supporting the identification strategy.
Figure 3 thus shows that relative to richer districts, poorer districts experienced
larger increases in federal revenue and current expenditure per pupil and larger
declines in local revenue per pupil over the 1960s. These changes were closely
timed with the introduction of Title I in 1965. These changes were also rapid, suggesting that it took only two to three years for districts to reach a new equilibrium.18
The remainder of this section establishes the magnitude of the fiscal responses and
demonstrates their robustness to additional controls.
B. Change Regressions
Differencing (1) evaluated at any two years, we arrive at
(2)

˜
Δyd s  =  ˜γs  +  θ ˜ child_ povertyd   +  β blac
kd   + Δεds    .

In this differenced model, the state fixed effects,  γ
˜ s, account for trends in fiscal outcomes common to districts in the same state, while the coefficients on child_ povertyd 
and blackd give changes over time in the gradients of fiscal outcomes in a district’s
17
To obtain these confidence intervals, we pooled the data from 1961 to 1969 and estimated the “stacked” version of equation (1) (again, giving each district equal weight). Formally, we estimated

yd st= δd+ γst+

∑  θj  ( child_ povertyd   × D  jt  )+ ∑  βj ( blackd   × D  jt  )  + ε dst,

j≠1964

j≠1964

where D   jt  is an indicator variable set to one if t = j, zero otherwise. δd is a district-specific intercept. We omit the
interactions between each of child_ povertyd and blackd with the indicator for 1964. The coefficients of interest—the
θj’s—thus measure the difference in the poverty gradient between 1964 and year j. The standard errors are clustered
on county because we use county-level information to predict district-level poverty rates (see online Appendix A).
In Figure 3, we rescale the confidence intervals on the θjs by adding the estimate of the 1964 poverty gradient from
equation (1).
18
Gordon (2004) finds that it took about three years for districts to crowd out changes in Title I grants in the
1990s.
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1960 child poverty rate and 1960 black enrollment share, respectively. We estimate
model (2) for two changes around the introduction of Title I—one entirely in the
pre-ESEA period (1961 to 1964) and one that spans the program’s introduction
(1964 to 1969). Recall that by 1969, the funds were no longer conditional on desegregation activity, reducing the chances that our estimates will reflect a fiscal response
to desegregation. Results are nevertheless substantively similar using end-year data
as early as 1967. We do not consider any later years because the federal government
began providing aid to desegregating districts in 1970 in a way that appears to have
been correlated with child poverty. Summary statistics for the dependent variables
are presented in the last two columns of Table 1.
The first two columns of Table 3 present estimates of model (2) for the preESEA and pre-to-post changes, respectively, using the same controls included in the
regressions plotted in Figure 3 (state indicators and 1960 black enrollment share). A
comparison of these columns confirms the intuition from the figure: changes in the
poverty gradients of federal revenue, current expenditure, and local revenue from
1964 to 1969 were more significant—economically and statistically—than p re-ESEA
changes. Focusing on the pre-to-post change in column 2, the coefficient on the 1960
child poverty rate in the model for per-pupil federal funding (panel A)—$990 (with
a standard error of $63)—is, as expected, quite close to the average state factor in the
Title I grant formula as of 1969—$954, shown in Table 2.19 Per-pupil current expenditure increased by $498 more between 1964 and 1969 in a district with only poor
children compared to a district with no poor children (panel B). Rescaling by the
corresponding change in per-pupil federal revenue, these estimates imply that each
additional dollar increase in per-pupil federal revenue generated a $0.50 increase in
per-pupil current expenditure.20 This estimate implies that the introduction of Title
I can account for an increase in current expenditure of about $212 per pupil for the
average district, or 23 percent of the average increase between 1964 and 1969.
To formalize this rescaling of the estimates into more intuitive dollar-for-dollar
terms, we estimate two-stage least squares (TSLS) regressions, using child_ povertyd 
as an instrument for the change in federal revenue.21 The results, reported in column 3, imply that our estimates leave $0.22 of federal revenue unaccounted for: each
dollar of additional federal revenue increased current expenditure by $0.50 (panel B),
but there was only $0.28 of total crowd-out—$0.33 local (panel D) less $0.05 state
(panel C). This difference is statistically significant ( p-value = 0.002). It could
represent an increase in spending on capital and debt service, which are included in
19
Data on the 1969 state factor are from US Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Subcommittee on
Education (1970). If all districts received their formula amounts under the Title I program (and Title I eligibility counts
did not change between 1965 and 1969), the change in the poverty gradient from 1964 to any year from 1965 to 1969
would be equal to the average state factor in that year. The coefficients on child_ povertyd  in 1965 and 1966 are less
than this since some southern districts did not receive Title I funds due to noncompliance with Title VI of the CRA.
20
Feldstein (1978) uses cross-state variation in Title I grants across districts with the same poverty rate in 1970,
and finds spending increased by $0.70 per grant dollar. Gordon (2004) exploits formula-based changes in funding
in the early 1990s and finds essentially full local crowd-out and no impact on current spending, but her estimates
have large standard errors.
21
We thus assume that there would have been no trend in the poverty gradient between 1964 and 1969 in the
absence of the program. If we instead take the trend from 1961 to 1964 as the counterfactual, similar to Finkelstein
(2007) in a study of Medicare’s introduction, our substantive conclusions are unchanged. Our estimates are also
robust to including pre-ESEA (1961 to 1964) changes as controls.
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Table 3—Reduced-Form and TSLS Estimates of the Fiscal Response
to the Introduction of Title I

Panel A. Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Child poverty rate, 1960
Black enrollment share, 1960
Panel B. Δ Per-pupil current expenditure
Child poverty rate, 1960
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue, 1964 to 1969
Black enrollment share, 1960
Panel C. Δ Per-pupil state revenue
Child poverty rate, 1960
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue, 1964 to 1969
Black enrollment share, 1960
Panel D. Δ Per-pupil local revenue
Child poverty rate, 1960
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue, 1964 to 1969
Black enrollment share, 1960
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
Number of districts

Reduced form

TSLS

1961 to 1964 1964 to 1969
(1)
(2)

1964 to 1969
(3)

10.12
(6.702)
−9.161**
(3.950)

990.4***
(63.15)
67.20
(41.46)

−59.30
(45.84)

497.5***
(92.84)

−20.24
(49.37)

369.2***
(71.49)

30.64
(21.29)

51.37
(40.29)

−1.486
(19.10)

83.34**
(33.02)

−60.21**
(25.89)

−323.4***
(54.37)

−33.32
(20.98)

122.5***
(40.91)

910

910

0.502***
(0.0795)
335.5***
(67.80)

0.0519
(0.0405)
79.85**
(34.56)

−0.327***
(0.0586)
144.4***
(46.40)
245.9
910

Notes: All dollar figures are in real 2009 US dollars. All specifications include state dummies
and 1960 black enrollment share as controls. The TSLS regressions in column 3 use the 1960
child poverty rate as an instrument for the 1964 to 1969 change in per-pupil federal revenue.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on county.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

total, but not current, expenditure. When we estimate the model using available data
on total expenditure, the results are similar to those for current expenditure but less
precise.22 Technically, this implies that districts used some of the new federal revenue
22
Reporting of total expenditure is not as consistent across states as that of current expenditure and revenue, and
because total expenditure includes capital expenditure, it exhibits much more year-to-year variation. In addition,
while in theory total revenue should be similar to total expenditure, at least on average and over long time periods,
this is not always the case in practice. Capital outlays can generate substantial departures of total expenditure from
total revenue in a given year. Finally, at least some states do not count proceeds from bond issues as “revenue,”
while the capital improvements financed by bond issues are sometimes included in total expenditure; thus, revenue
can be persistently lower than expenditure.
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to reduce existing debt, acquire less new debt, or build up reserves. This would allow
districts either to lower taxes or to increase spending in the future.
While our estimates do not account for every cent of Title I revenue, they are
estimated precisely enough to draw economically meaningful conclusions about the
program’s fiscal impacts. We can rule out substantial reallocation of state funds,
and the confidence interval for the local revenue estimate suggests that the average
school district engaged in economically meaningful offset. The estimate for current
expenditure (the targeted good) is significantly different from both one and zero,
and also significantly larger than the response that existing estimates of the income
elasticity of education demand would imply—$0.12 to $0.19 per dollar in the average district, according to our back-of-the-envelope estimate.23
C. Robustness
As we have discussed, the primary threat to identification in our empirical strategy comes from desegregation-related changes in school finance. Although Title I
receipt and desegregation were no longer explicitly linked by the late 1960s, schools
across the South desegregated substantially in the late 1960s (Cascio et al. 2008). If
desegregation increased demand for school spending more in poorer districts than in
richer districts, those effects could be difficult to distinguish from those associated
with the introduction of Title I.24 Our main control for the effects of desegregation is
black enrollment share. Table 3 presents coefficients on black share from estimates
of model (2), for comparison with the existing literature. Black enrollment share
is positively related to changes in per-pupil current expenditure, state revenue, and
local revenue between 1964 and 1969, consistent with demand for funding having
increased more in districts with higher black enrollment shares due to desegregation
and with the results for Louisiana reported in Reber (2011).
The first columns of Table 4 show the stability of the coefficients of interest as
we include more controls that correlate with desegregation or more flexible functional forms for black enrollment share. Column 1 repeats the TSLS estimates from
column 3 of Table 3 for the purposes of comparison. In column 2, we interact black
enrollment share with state dummies, thus allowing its effects to differ across states,
and in column 3, we include indicators for deciles of black enrollment share in lieu
of the linear term in column 1. Column 4 returns to the baseline linear specification and adds more district characteristics that Cascio et al. (2008) identified as
predictive of the path to desegregation in the South—the share of the vote cast in
the county for Strom Thurmond in the 1948 presidential election (Clubb, Flanigan,
and Zingale 2006), a proxy for segregationist preferences, and (the natural log of)
1960 enrollment, a measure of district size. The TSLS coefficients are little changed.
23
See online Appendix B for details. Put differently, the income elasticity would have had to have been about
1.7 to explain our estimates of the Title I-induced increase in education spending. Fisher and Papke (2000) cite
estimates of the income elasticity of demand for education spending ranging from 0.40 to 0.65.
24
Theoretically, desegregation could have decreased demand for school spending. For example, dissatisfaction
among whites, increases in private school enrollment, or falling property values may have reduced local support
for schools (Clotfelter 1976; Baum-Snow and Lutz 2011). However, the available empirical evidence suggests that
desegregation increased demand for spending (Reber 2011; Johnson 2011).
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Table 4—Sensitivity of the Estimated Long-Run Fiscal Responses to the Introduction of Title I
Baseline
Panel A. Δ Per-pupil current expenditure
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Root MSE
Panel B. Δ Per-pupil state revenue
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Root MSE
Panel C. Δ Per-pupil local revenue
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Root MSE
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
Number of districts

(1)

Change functional form of black sharea Desegregationb
(2)

(3)

(4)

0.502***
(0.0795)
289.6

0.482***
(0.0822)
288.2

0.526***
(0.0950)
290.0

0.462***
(0.0828)
290.1

0.0519
(0.0405)
145.8

0.0218
(0.0402)
142.8

−0.00485
(0.0479)
145.9

0.0672
(0.0423)
144.7

−0.327***
(0.0586)
217.8
245.9
910

−0.320***
(0.0595)
217.8
240.3
910

−0.273***
(0.0672)
215.0
187.0
910

−0.310***
(0.0608)
217.2
225.6
910

Other concurrent policy changes
Voting Rights
Actc
(5)

Panel A. Δ Per-pupil current expenditure
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Root MSE
Panel B. Δ Per-pupil state revenue
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Root MSE
Panel C. Δ Per-pupil local revenue
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
Root MSE
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
Number of districts

Head Startd
(6)

Other federal
programse
(7)

All preexisting
characteristicsb,d
(8)

0.499***
(0.0922)
294.4

0.501***
(0.0950)
289.8

0.485***
(0.0838)
289.2

0.464***
(0.0982)
290.2

0.0457
(0.0488)
149.7

0.0368
(0.0484)
146.0

0.0634
(0.0430)
145.0

0.0529
(0.0492)
144.8

−0.304***
(0.0653)
218.1
179.5
812

−0.336***
(0.0737)
218.4
174.4
910

−0.334***
(0.0613)
217.1
230.2
909

−0.321***
(0.0741)
218.0
168.9
910

Notes: Changes in fiscal variables correspond to 1964 to 1969 and are in real 2009 US dollars. Each column and
panel represents a different TSLS regression. Unless otherwise noted, all regressions include state dummies and
1960 black enrollment share as controls. The instrument for the change in per-pupil federal revenue is the 1960
child poverty rate. See online Appendix A for a detailed description of control variables and data sources. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on county.
a
Column 2 interacts 1960 black enrollment share with state dummies. Column 3 replaces 1960 black enrollment
share with dummies for deciles of 1960 black enrollment share.
b
ln (1960 district enrollment) and dummies for quintiles of 1948 Thurmond vote share added as controls.
c
Black voter registration rate in early 1960s added as a control.
d
Dummy for one of the 300 poorest counties in 1960 added as a control.
e
Changes in transfers for other federal programs added as controls.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

Below, we also show that child poverty does not predict the intensity of desegregation, as measured by the dissimilarity index, and that the spending response was
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larger but the level of desegregation no higher for districts more limited in their ability to offset Title I by reducing local revenue.
Taken together, these results suggest that the relative increase in spending among
poorer districts during this period was not due to desegregation. The remainder of
the table explores other potential confounds. Increases in black political power following the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) may have resulted in larger increases
in education spending for higher poverty districts. Controlling for black enrollment
share should account for these impacts to a large extent, but as another test, we
include the black voter registration rate in the early 1960s as a proxy for how suppressed the vote was before the VRA.25 The estimates are little affected (column 5).
The estimates are likewise little changed in column 6, where we include an indicator
for whether the district was in one of the 300 poorest counties in 1960. These counties received special grant-writing assistance in the 1960s for Head Start (Ludwig
and Miller 2007), another program for poor children implemented in the mid-1960s
that sometimes channeled funds through school districts. In column 7, we include
Head Start spending at the county level as of 1968 along with changes in federal
outlays to counties between 1962 and 1969 for other programs—public assistance,
retirement programs, and health programs.26 The estimates are quite similar to the
baseline specification. Controlling simultaneously for all preexisting characteristics
available for the full sample (column 8) also generates similar estimates as our baseline specification.
IV. Heterogeneous Fiscal Responses to Title I

We expect that school districts reduced local revenue less in response to Title I,
thereby increasing spending more, when grants were large relative to local revenue.
As discussed in Section II, we expect less crowd-out in districts that would have
liked to consume on the restricted portion of the budget constraint. However, even
if they did not consume literally at the corner, districts with large Title I grants relative to local revenue may also have been more likely constrained to offset less than
they would have liked. Given the underlying increase in funding from all sources
over this period (Figure 1), reducing local revenue relative to the counterfactual
without actively reducing tax rates would have been relatively quick and easy for
districts where the grant was small relative to local revenue: they could have simply increased local revenue somewhat less than they otherwise would have. In districts where the grant was large relative to counterfactual local revenue, on the other

25
James Alt generously provided the data for all states except Virginia. We entered data for Virginia from US
Commission on Civil Rights (1968). The exact year that black voter registration is measured differs across states
subject to data availability (see Alt 1994). Black voter registration rates were on average lower in southern states
with literacy tests that were abolished by the VRA (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia). Cascio and Washington (2012) show that counties with higher black population
shares in these states saw larger increases in voter turnout and state transfers (largely for education) after the VRA
than counties with higher black population shares elsewhere in the South. The specification in Table 4, column 2
embodies this finding, allowing the effects of black share to differ by state.
26
Jens Ludwig and Douglas Miller generously provided the list of the 300 poorest counties and Head Start
allocations for 1968. Douglas Almond, Hilary Hoynes, and Diane Schanzenbach generously provided the data on
changes in federal outlays for other programs.

VOL. 5 NO. 3

CASCIO ET AL.: LOCAL RESPONSES TO FEDERAL GRANTS

143

hand, actual reductions in local revenue, or significantly more time, may have been
required to offset Title I.
These observations motivate our investigation of differential fiscal responses
depending on the ratio of the Title I grant relative to (counterfactual) local revenue,
which we expect to be negatively related to the ease with which a district could offset the grant—the “scope for local offset.” This analysis serves as a test of the internal validity of our research design; if our estimates are causal, the spending effects
should be larger where we expect them to be in theory. But the analysis serves
two important additional purposes. First, because incentives to desegregate (and
as we show below, realized desegregation) did not vary with scope for local offset,
the results provide an additional way to rule out desegregation as a mechanism or
confounder of the results presented in the previous section. Second, the existence
of differential spending responses to Title I related to scope for local offset gives us
an intuitively appealing way to estimate the effects of Title I-induced spending on
educational outcomes.
We would like to know how large the Title I grant was relative to what local
revenue would have been in 1969 in the absence of the program; this would tell us
by what percent the district would have had to reduce local revenue, relative to the
counterfactual, to offset the grant fully. We do not observe counterfactual local revenue, so we estimate it using a district-specific linear extrapolation of the p re-ESEA
trend in local revenue from 1961 to 1964.27 The magnitude of this ratio is much
more sensitive than the rank order of districts that it implies to how we estimate
counterfactual local revenue.28 We therefore exploit the rank order of districts by
dividing the sample into quartiles according to this measure, rather than interpreting the magnitudes as described above. Although this proxy for scope for offset is
noisy, it appears to carry signal throughout its distribution: the magnitudes of the
TSLS estimates for changes in per-pupil local revenue and current expenditure are
monotonic in the expected direction in quartiles of the proxy (see Table A1). For
simplicity, we split the sample at the seventy-fifth percentile and consider the top
quartile to encompass “low scope for local offset” districts. Results are substantively
similar, but the differences in spending effects less dramatic, if we split the sample
at the median of this measure.
Districts with low scope for offset were poorer, blacker, and smaller, on average,
compared to the rest of the sample (Table A2). This is not surprising since these districts had larger Title I grants, lower local revenue, or both. To estimate the effects
of Title I on fiscal outcomes separately for these two groups of districts, we need to
assume that the identification assumption described above holds in each subsample;
27
In a few instances, the prediction for per-pupil local revenue for 1969 was negative. In these cases, we recoded
per-pupil local revenue to a small positive number to ensure that the district was coded as having “low scope for
local offset” in the analysis to follow. Our substantive results are unchanged if we predict per-pupil local revenue
in 1969 on the basis of pre-ESEA trends in the natural log of per-pupil local revenue (or in percentage terms), to
ensure that the 1969 prediction of per-pupil local revenue is always positive. Likewise, we obtain similar results
when the denominator of this measure is instead a prediction of combined per-pupil local and state revenue arrived
at using the same approach.
28
For example, an alternative approach would be to base our counterfactual on 1964 local revenue only. The
rank order of districts would be the same regardless of what we assumed for the (common) growth rate of local
revenue between 1964 and 1969, though the magnitude of scope for local offset would vary widely.
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Figure 4. Year-by-Year Gradients of District Finance Variables
in the 1960 Child Poverty Rate, by Scope for Local Offset
Notes: All figures are in real 2009 US dollars. A district is classified as having “low scope for local offset” if it
ranked in the top quartile of the ratio of predicted per-pupil Title I grant to predicted per-pupil local revenue for 1969.
Predicted per-pupil local revenue assumes the district-specific linear trend from 1961 to 1964 would have continued
to 1969. The dots represent the coefficients on the 1960 district child poverty rate from (unweighted) year-specific
regressions, estimated separately for districts with and without low scope for local offset that also include state dummies, the 1960 district black enrollment share, the natural log of 1960 district enrollment, dummies for quintiles of
county vote share for Strom Thurmond in the 1948 presidential election, and a dummy for whether the district was in
one of the 300 poorest counties in 1960 as controls. The capped lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals on the
estimated difference between the poverty gradient in a given year and its value in 1964. To obtain these confidence
intervals, we estimated a regression using pooled data from 1961 to 1969 for the subsample in question that included
district dummies, state-by-year dummies, and interactions between year dummies (for all years except 1964) and
each of the control variables, clustering standard errors on county. The confidence intervals shown are those for the
coefficients on the interactions between the 1960 child poverty rate and year dummies, rescaled by the subsamplespecific estimates of the 1964 poverty gradient. See footnote 17 for more details.

that is, absent the program, there would not have been a sharp break in the poverty gradient for the outcomes of interest around 1965. Figure 4 shows trends in the poverty
gradients separately for low scope for offset districts (solid dots) and other districts
(hollow dots). The change in the poverty gradient in federal revenue was the same
for both samples (panel A), as expected based on the Title I formula, but increases in
federal revenue appear to have translated into higher spending at a much higher rate
in low scope for offset districts (panel B). This is because there was significantly more
local offset in other districts (panel D). Thus, while the initial levels of the poverty
gradients sometimes differ across the two samples, there is no apparent pre-ESEA
trend in the poverty gradient for any of the outcomes, consistent with the results presented in Figure 3 for the full sample and supportive of the identification assumption.
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Table 5—The Desegregation Response to the Introduction of Title I
and Heterogeneity in the Fiscal and Desegregation Response
to the Introduction of Title I by Scope for Local Offset
Δ (1964 to 1969 ) in per-pupil:

Dependent variable:
Panel A. Full sample

Δ Per-pupil federal revenue,
1964 to 1969
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
Number of districts

Current
expenditure
(1)

State
revenue
(2)

Local
revenue
(3)

1970 dissimilarity
index
(4)

0.464***
(0.0982)
168.9
910

0.0529
(0.0492)
168.9
910

−0.321***
(0.0741)
168.9
910

0.881***
(0.167)
35.29
227

0.0101
(0.0886)
35.29
227

−0.0262
(0.101)
35.29
227

0.000151
(0.000121)
32.79
207

0.208
(0.154)
86.20
683

0.0326
(0.0777)
86.20
683

−0.564***
(0.127)
86.20
683

−1.05e-05
(8.99e-05)
73.71
646

0.673***
(0.226)
910

−0.0225
(0.117)
910

0.538***
(0.161)
910

0.000162
(0.000149)
853

8.77e-05
(6.30e-05)
146.6
853

Panel B. By scope for local offset
1. Districts with low scope for offset
  
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue,
   1964 to 1969
  First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
  Number of districts
2. Other districts
  Δ Per-pupil federal revenue,
   1964 to 1969
  First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
  Number of districts
3. Difference
  
Δ Per-pupil federal revenue
   
× low scope for offset
Number of districts

Notes: All dollar figures are in real 2009 US dollars. Each column and panel presents coefficient estimates from
a TSLS regression. All regressions include state dummies, 1960 black enrollment share, ln(1960 district enrollment), an indicator that the district is in one of the 300 poorest counties in 1960, and indicators for quintiles of the
Thurmond vote share as controls. In panels A, B1, and B2, we instrument for the 1964 to 1969 change in per-pupil
federal revenue with the 1960 child poverty rate. In panel B3, we instrument for the 1964 to 1969 change in per-pupil
federal revenue with the 1960 child poverty rate, and we instrument for the 1964 to 1969 change in per-pupil federal
revenue interacted with the low scope for offset indicator with the 1960 child poverty rate interacted with low scope
for offset indicator. A district is classified as having “low scope for local offset” if it ranked in the top quartile of the
ratio of predicted per-pupil Title I grant to predicted per-pupil local revenue for 1969. Predicted per-pupil local revenue assumes the district-specific linear trend from 1961 to 1964 would have continued to 1969. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered on county.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.

To facilitate the dollar-for-dollar interpretation, we estimate TSLS regressions
separately for the two samples and present results in Table 5 analogous to those in
Table 4. All specifications include controls for all preexisting variables that can be
measured for all districts (column 8 of Table 4). Columns 1 to 3 of Table 5 show the
effect of the 1964 to 1969 change in per-pupil federal revenue on the 1964 to 1969
changes in per-pupil spending, per-pupil state revenue, and per-pupil local revenue,
respectively, separately for districts with low scope for local offset (panel B1) and
for all other districts (panel B2). Estimates for the full sample in the same specification are repeated in panel A for comparison.
The estimates by scope for offset align with our expectations and the results shown
graphically above. Current expenditure increased substantially more between 1964
and 1969 in districts with low scope for local offset—a statistically significant $0.88
for each dollar of federal revenue, compared to an insignificant $0.21 on the dollar
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for the remaining districts (column 1). The difference in these estimates is a statistically significant $0.67 (panel B3). There is no significant state revenue response
for either group of districts, and no significant difference in state revenue responses
across the two subsamples (column 2). However, for the quarter of districts with
low scope for offset, there was indeed no reduction in local revenue in response to
Title I, while the remaining districts reduced local revenue by $0.56 on the dollar.
The difference in local revenue responses across the two groups is a statistically
significant $0.54, which can account for a substantial fraction of the difference in
spending effects across groups.29
If our estimates are confounded by desegregation, we would expect to see a different relationship between the poverty rate and desegregation in the low scope for
offset districts, where Title I funding increased spending more, compared to the rest
of the sample. In column 4, we show results from the same specification as in columns 1 to 3, but using as a dependent variable the realized level of desegregation as
measured by the dissimilarity index in 1970.30 In fact, the 1960 poverty rate is not
related to the realized level of desegregation in the full sample (panel A) or either
subsample (panel B). The estimates are statistically insignificant and substantively
small,31 suggesting that desegregation-related changes in demand for school spending are not biasing the estimated effects of Title I on fiscal outcomes.
V. Title I and Educational Attainment

The results thus far suggest that Title I raised school spending in the South, and
considerably more so in districts where the grants were large relative to estimated
counterfactual local revenue, where the ability to offset Title I funds was likely constrained. Did these increases in school spending improve student outcomes? Data on
educational outcomes at the county or district level are limited for this time period,
and we do not have annual measures of educational outcomes as we did for the
29

One might be concerned that these estimates reflect variation in the fiscal response along some other dimension correlated with low scope for offset, like having a high black enrollment share or a high poverty rate. Potential
heterogeneity by black enrollment share is particularly interesting because of the key role that race played in
southern politics and school finance during this period. When we estimate fully interacted versions of the models
estimated for Table 5, panel B3 to check for heterogeneous fiscal responses by low scope for local offset and
high black enrollment share simultaneously, the estimates for scope for offset are statistically and substantively
unchanged, and there is no significant heterogeneity by black enrollment share. Separately identifying differential
responses by low scope for offset and child poverty is more difficult. When we allow higher poverty districts to have
a differential response, the coefficient on the low scope for offset interaction falls in the specifications predicting
changes in current expenditure and local revenue, and the standard errors increase. Neither interaction coefficient
is individually significant, though they are jointly significant. While it is therefore possible that Title I grants were
“stickier” in low scope for offset districts because they were “stickier” in poor districts, we do not have the power
to distinguish between these hypotheses.
30
We calculated the dissimilarity index using school-level data on enrollment by race for fall 1970 reported in
HEW (1972). We use data from 1970 rather than 1969 because district coverage is more complete, and the legal
environment was similar in both years. Results are similar for 1969. In results not reported, as an alternative way
to address the concern that desegregation could be confounding the results, we added the 1970 dissimilarity index
as well as an indicator for the presence of a court order in 1970 to the specifications reported in Table 4. This did
not affect the coefficients of interest, but we do not report these results since both of these variables are potentially
endogenous to the Title I grant.
31
A typical major court-ordered school desegregation plan reduced the dissimilarity index by about 0.22 (Reber
2005). By comparison, the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient in panel A suggests
that an additional $100 Title I-induced increase in federal revenue was associated with a reduction in the dissimilarity index of only 0.004.
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analysis of fiscal outcomes. While we think it is instructive to analyze trends in educational attainment for this period to shed light on the potential effects of Title I, we
therefore consider these results to be significantly more speculative than the results
presented above.
Recall there was limited enforcement of even nominal targeting to “educationally
deprived” students during this era, so Title I-induced increases in school e xpenditure
could easily have benefited other children. We therefore examine how Title I affected
all students, and view our analysis as being more closely related to the literature on
the effects of school spending on student outcomes than the literature on the achievement effects of Title I.32 We do, however, present separate estimates for blacks and
whites to explore the possible importance of race in the within-district allocation of
funds. All states discontinued publication of spending by race by the mid-1960s, so
we cannot examine this directly. Up to that time, school boards allocated state funding disproportionately to white schools (Margo 1990; Reber 2011); the same local
school boards controlled the disbursal of Title I funds to schools, which were still
largely identifiable by race during our study period. Prior to legislative and regulatory
changes in 1970, school boards could comply with the letter but not the spirit of Title I
by giving the new federal dollars to poorer and blacker schools while simultaneously
redistributing other revenue streams to continue to favor white schools on net.
A. Graphical and Regression Evidence
Our outcome of interest is the change in the high school dropout rate of 18–19-yearolds over the 1960s, where the high school dropout rate is defined as the share
of individuals who are neither enrolled in school nor have 12 years of completed
schooling.33 High school dropout, unlike other student outcomes of interest, can be
consistently observed at a local level both before and after Title I. It was also a relevant margin of attainment for the South at this time, as 32 percent of whites and 45
percent of blacks aged 18 and 19 were high school dropouts in 1960.34 We purchased
special tabulations of the 1960 and 1970 censuses of population to estimate dropout
rates for those years at the lowest possible level of geographic disaggregation—the
county.35 Because counties vary dramatically in size, and school districts, not counties, are the relevant decision makers, we weight the analysis by county population
Several major studies—the Sustaining Effects Study (Carter 1984) and the Prospects study (Puma et al.
1997)—attempt to estimate the effects of participating in Title I programs on student outcomes. These studies
implicitly assume that participation in a Title I program reflects additional resources to the participating student
(not full crowd-out), and that nonparticipating students are unaffected (no spillovers). Identifying these effects is
difficult, given the negative selection of participants by design (see Borman and D’Agostino (1996) for a review).
33
Technically speaking, the high school dropout rate so defined may include individuals who never started high
school, as students commonly exited the educational system before high school during this period (Collins and
Margo 2006).
34
Reducing high school dropout rates would be unambiguously good if graduation standards were clearly
defined and followed. If schools graduate more students because of pressure to do so, rather than increasing shares
of students achieving some set level of competency, dropout rates do not reveal underlying changes in true levels
of human capital.
35
Our sample includes 838 districts in 647 counties. We restrict attention to counties where districts in our
estimation sample represent at least 90 percent of total county enrollment in 1960. Though all discussion of impacts
on high school dropout refers to counties, recall that the relevant fiscal decisions are made at and aggregated from
the district level.
32
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Panel A. Counties with low scope for local offset
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Panel B. Other counties
1,500

1. Per-pupil current expenditure
1964 to 1969

0

−1,500
−0.3

2. High school dropout ages 18–19
1960 to 1970

60

0

−0.2

−0.1

0

0.1

0.2

Residual child poverty rate, 1960

0.3

−60

−0.3

−0.2

−0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

Residual child poverty rate, 1960

Figure 5. The 1960 Child Poverty Rate and Differences in Current Expenditure
and White High School Dropout Rates over the 1960s, by Scope for Local Offset
Notes: All figures are in real US 2009 dollars. A county is classified as having “low scope for local offset” if all districts in the county ranked in the top quartile of the ratio of predicted per-pupil Title I grant to predicted per-pupil
local revenue for 1969. Predicted per-pupil local revenue assumes the district-specific linear trend from 1961 to
1964 would have continued to 1969. The hollow dots represent the residuals from regressions, estimated separately
for counties with and without low scope for local offset, that also include state dummies, the 1960 county black
enrollment share, the natural log of 1960 county enrollment, dummies for quintiles of county vote share for Strom
Thurmond in the 1948 presidential election, a dummy for whether the county was one of the 300 poorest in 1960,
and the high school dropout rate of white 18–19-year-olds in the county in 1960. The regressions are weighted (and
the dot sizes represent) the 1960 population of white 18–19-year-olds.

(of 18–19-year-olds, by race) in 1960. The estimates are substantively similar but
less precise when we estimate the model without weights, suggesting that weighting
primarily corrects for heteroskedasticity. On average, southern blacks experienced a
14.1 percentage point reduction in likelihood of high school dropout at ages 18 to 19
between 1960 and 1970; for whites, this figure was 10 percentage points.
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Table 6—Reduced-Form Relationship between 1960 Child Poverty Rate
and Changes in Current School Expenditure
and High School Dropout Rates at the County Level

Dependent variable:

Δ Per-pupil
current
expenditure,
1964–1969
(1)

Δ White
HS dropout
ages 18–19,
1960–1970
(2)

Panel A. Sample: Counties with low scope for local offset
Child poverty, 1960
Number of counties

1,156.32***
(287.77)
152

Δ Per-pupil
current
expenditure,
1964–1969
(3)

Δ Black
HS dropout
ages 18–19,
1960–1970
(4)

−39.98***
(10.59)
152

1,181.56***
(321.19)
135

7.75
(11.58)
135

4.76
(3.37)
495

564.98***
(172.87)
470

6.69
(5.05)
470

Panel B. Sample: Other counties
Child poverty, 1960
Number of counties

338.89
(244.81)
495

Panel C. Full sample: Difference
Child poverty, 1960
× low scope for local offset
Number of counties
Weight

817.43**
(372.11)
647

−44.74***
(10.78)
647

Whites ages 18–19, 1960

616.58*
(354.43)
605

1.06
(12.23)
605

Blacks ages 18–19, 1960

Notes: The change in per-pupil current expenditure (columns 1 and 3) is in real 2009 US
dollars. Each column and panel presents estimates from a different regression. All regressions are weighted by the race-specific population of 18–19-year-olds in 1960. All regressions
include state dummies, 1960 black enrollment share, ln(1960 district enrollment), an indicator that the county was one of the 300 poorest counties in 1960, indicators for quintiles of the
Thurmond county vote share, and the race-specific high school dropout rate of 18–19-year-olds
in 1960 as controls; in panel C, these controls are interacted with the low scope for offset indicator. Throughout, attention is restricted to counties where districts in our estimation sample
represent at least 90 percent of total county enrollment in 1960. A county is classified as having
“low scope for local offset” if all districts in the county ranked in the top quartile of the ratio
of predicted per-pupil Title I grant to predicted per-pupil local revenue for 1969. Predicted perpupil local revenue assumes the district-specific linear trend from 1961 to 1964 would have
continued to 1969. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity robust.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

We exploit the heterogeneity in the spending response, shown above, as a source of
identification. To set ideas, the first column in Figure 5 shows the r egression-adjusted
relationship between 1960 child poverty rates and the change in per-pupil current
expenditure between 1964 and 1969, separately in counties where all districts had
low scope for local offset (panel A) and in the remaining counties (panel B); the
slope estimates are presented in the first column of the same respective panels of
Table 6. The regressions were estimated using county aggregates of the districtlevel finance data and are otherwise similar to the reduced-form specifications that
underlie the district-level TSLS estimates in Table 5.36 The dot sizes represent the

36

County aggregates were generated from all district-level data weighting by 1960 district enrollment. The
specification also includes the 1960 race-specific high school dropout rate of 18–19-year-olds to account for the
possibility that the trend in high school dropout depended on the starting point. We unfortunately cannot examine
(or control for) trends in high school dropout by race at the county level during the 1950s.
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Panel A. Counties with low scope for local offset
1. Per-pupil current expenditure, 1964 to 1969
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Panel B. Other counties
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Figure 6. The 1960 Child Poverty Rate and Differences in Current Expenditure
and Black High School Dropout Rates over the 1960s, by Scope for Local Offset
Notes: All figures are in 2009 US dollars. A county is classified as having “low scope for local offset” if all districts in the county ranked in the top quartile of the ratio of predicted per-pupil Title I grant to predicted per-pupil
local revenue for 1969. Predicted per-pupil local revenue assumes the district-specific linear trend from 1961 to
1964 would have continued to 1969. The hollow dots represent the residuals from regressions, estimated separately
for counties with and without low scope for local offset, that also include state dummies, the 1960 county black
enrollment share, the natural log of 1960 county enrollment, dummies for quintiles of county vote share for Strom
Thurmond in the 1948 presidential election, a dummy for whether the county was one of the 300 poorest in 1960,
and the high school dropout rate of black 18–19-year-olds in the county in 1960. The regressions are weighted (and
the dot sizes represent) the 1960 population of black 18–19-year-olds.

size of the county’s 18–19-year-old white population in 1960 to reflect weighting
of the regression fit. Consistent with findings reported in Table 5, school spending
became much more progressive over the second half of the 1960s in the subsample
of counties where the scope for local offset by districts was low. The finding is
similar in the subsample of counties with black populations and weighting by initial

VOL. 5 NO. 3

CASCIO ET AL.: LOCAL RESPONSES TO FEDERAL GRANTS

151

county black population, as shown in the first column of Figure 6 and the third column of Table 6.
If “money mattered,” we would expect to see greater convergence in educational
attainment between poorer and richer counties over the 1960s in the subsample
where the scope for local offset was low, or where Title I translated into more spending at a higher rate. We explore this in the second column of each figure using the
same specification as in the first column, but replacing the dependent variable with
the 1960 to 1970 change in high school dropout rates of 18–19-year-olds. For whites
(column 2 of Table 6), the reduction in high school dropout over the 1960s was
much larger in poorer counties than richer counties in the subsample with low scope
for offset (panel A), but not elsewhere (panel B), suggesting that Title I-induced
spending increases improved white educational outcomes. This was not the case for
blacks, however (column 4).
We rescale the reduced-form estimates for high school dropout by the corresponding reduced-form estimates for the 1964 to 1969 change in annual per-pupil
spending to make their magnitudes more interpretable. For example, the estimates in
panel A imply that each additional $100 increase in per-pupil school spending was
associated with a 3.46 percentage point decrease in high school dropout for whites
(= −39.98/(1,156.32/100)). We take this approach to maintain consistency with
our empirical analysis thus far, but note that scaling by the cumulative increase in
spending resulting from Title I may be more appropriate. The cohorts in our analysis
were exposed to about five years of Title I-induced spending increases before we
observe high school dropout in 1970 (the 1969–1970 school year). Title I grants
were slightly smaller in the early years (and some districts did not receive their
grants due to noncompliance with the CRA), so an additional $100 in spending by
fall 1969 likely corresponds to somewhat less than $500 of additional cumulative
spending between 1965 and 1969. To think about the effects of an additional $100
of cumulative spending exposure, the estimates presented would therefore need to
be scaled down by about a factor of around five.
We present TSLS estimates of the effects of changes in current expenditure on
changes in high school dropout in Table 7. In panel A, we instrument for the change
in per-pupil current expenditure (in hundreds of real 2009 US dollars) with the 1960
child poverty rate, limiting the sample to counties with low scope for offset, where
the spending response to Title I for both blacks and whites was statistically significant. This is the formalization of the example described intuitively above. The
identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the Title I, there would have been no
change in the poverty gradient in outcomes in these counties. In panel B, we instrument for the change in per-pupil current expenditure with the 1960 child poverty
rate interacted with an indicator for whether the county’s districts had low scope
for offset using the full sample. These estimates rescale the reduced-form estimate
for the change in high school dropout in panel C of Table 6 by the corresponding reduced-form estimate for the change in per-pupil current expenditure. In this
specification, we thus allow the 1960 child poverty rate to have an effect on high
school dropout through channels other than educational expenditure. The identifying assumption here is that, in the absence of the program, changes in the poverty
gradient in high school dropout would have been the same in both sets of counties.
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Table 7—TSLS Estimates of the Effect of School Spending on High School Dropout by Race
Δ White high school dropout (%), 1960–70:

Ages 18–19
(1)

Ages 18–19
(2)

−10.0
−10.0
Panel A. Instrument is 1960 child poverty rate (sample is counties with low scope for local offset)
Δ Per-pupil current expenditure ($100s), 1964 to 1969
−3.46***
−4.52**
(1.25)
(1.88)
Root MSE
15.42
17.74
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
16.15
9.78
Number of counties
152
152
Mean of dependent variable

Panel B. Instrument is 1960 child poverty rate × low scope for local offset ( full sample)
Δ Per-pupil current expenditure ($100s), 1964 to 1969
−5.47*
−6.28*
(2.80)
(3.72)
Root MSE
17.26
19.31
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
4.826
3.536
Number of counties
647
646
Δ Black high school dropout (%), 1960–70:

Ages 18–19
(4)

Ages 18–19
(5)

−14.1
−14.1
Panel A. Instrument is 1960 child poverty rate (sample is counties with low scope for local offset)
0.66
1.17
Δ Per-pupil current expenditure ($100s), 1964 to 1969
(1.05)
(1.09)
Root MSE
10.28
10.51
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
13.53
13.54
Number of counties
135
135
Mean of dependent variable

Panel B. Instrument is 1960 child poverty rate × low scope for local offset ( full sample)
0.17
0.98
Δ Per-pupil current expenditure ($100s), 1964 to 1969
(2.01)
(1.82)
Root MSE
8.159
8.569
First-stage partial F-stat on instrument
3.026
4.081
Number of counties
605
604
Additional controls?

Ages 25+
(3)
−7.7

0.55
(0.41)
4.252
20.39
152
0.48
(0.56)
3.63
4.346
646
Ages 25+
(6)
−7.9

0.39
(0.24)
2.35
13.49
124
−0.29
(0.46)
2.430
3.180
541

X

Notes: The change in per-pupil current expenditure is in hundreds of real 2009 US dollars. Each column and panel
presents estimates from a different regression. All regressions are weighted by the race-specific 1960 county population of the relevant age group. All regressions include state dummies, 1960 black enrollment share, ln (1960 district enrollment), an indicator that the county was one of the 300 poorest counties in 1960, indicators for quintiles
of the Thurmond county vote share, and race-specific 1960 high school dropout rates of the relevant age group as
controls; in panel B, these controls are interacted with the low scope for offset indicator. “Additional controls”
include changes in transfers to the county for other federal programs from 1962–1969, which are interacted with
the low scope for offset indicator in panel B. Throughout, attention is restricted to counties where districts in our
estimation sample represent at least 90 percent of total county enrollment in 1960. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are heteroskedasticity robust.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.

Columns 1 and 4 of Table 7 present the TSLS estimates for the baseline specification for changes in white and black high school dropout rates, respectively. The estimates in panel A, which come from the first identification strategy, imply that each
additional $100 increase in annual current expenditure per pupil between 1964 and
1969 was associated with a statistically significant 3.46 percentage point decrease
in the likelihood of white high school dropout, and an insignificant 0.66 percentage point increase in the likelihood of black high school dropout over the 1960s.
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Allowing for a direct effect of 1960 poverty by using other counties as a comparison group, in panel B, we find slightly more negative estimates—a marginally
statistically significant −5.47 for whites, and an insignificant 0.17 for blacks. The
first stage is unsurprisingly weaker in these models, which are more demanding
of the data.37 Nevertheless, these models suggest that failure to allow for a direct
effect of 1960 child poverty on high school dropout rates may bias the models in
panel A against finding an effect. Indeed, though generally not statistically significant, the coefficients on the 1960 child poverty rate in the second specification (not
shown) are positive.
The estimates are robust to several specification tests. For example, in columns 2
and 5, we include changes in transfer payments to the county over the 1960s through
other federal programs, including Head Start and Medicaid, and see if anything an
increase in the magnitude of the estimates for whites.38 Perhaps more compelling,
we see no effect of spending on high school dropout rates of individuals whose secondary education would have been completed prior to 1965, using as a dependent
variable the change between 1960 and 1970 in the percent of a county’s whites
and blacks aged 25 and older without a high school degree (columns 3 and 6).39
Presumably, unobserved shocks to educational attainment in the county population—through migration, for example—would have affected this older age group
as well.
We do not have similar county-level data for 1950, so we cannot directly conduct
the “placebo test” on pre-ESEA trends. We have located county-level data for 1950
and 1960 on the school enrollment rates of 16–17-year-olds, however (Historical
Census Browser 2004). These data cover a different age group and, more importantly, are not reported separately by race. Nevertheless, the trend in this measure
should reflect general trends in educational attainment of young people during the
1950s. The coefficients of interest reported in Table 7 are not affected by the inclusion of the change in this variable between 1950 and 1960. When we estimated the
specifications in columns 1 and 4 with the 1950 to 1960 change in enrollment rates
as the dependent variable, the point estimate on the change in per-pupil current
expenditure from 1964 to 1969 was always insignificant and small relative to the
estimates for white high school dropout over the 1960s, with large standard errors;
furthermore, the coefficient was negative in three out of four cases, suggesting, if
anything, increases in dropout over the 1950s.
Because spending was low and high school dropout rates high during the period
of study, the effects on educational attainment that we estimate may be larger than
would be expected from modern-day spending increases. It is difficult to compare
37
Note that the first-stage coefficients reported in Table 7 should be compared to the reduced-form coefficients
in Table 5. For example, the reduced-form F-stat on the instrument from the district-level TSLS models linking
federal revenue to spending in column 1 of Table 5, panel B1 is 16.56. The first-stage F-stats from the county-level
TSLS models linking spending to high school dropout reported in Table 7, panel A are slightly smaller because the
county-aggregated data offer less variation in the key explanatory variables and fewer observations, reducing power.
38
These estimates are similarly unaffected by the inclusion of the 1970 dissimilarity index as a control. The
estimates in panel B are also substantively similar but less precise when allow for heterogeneity in the direct effects
of child poverty by whether all districts in the county had high (top quartile) 1960 black enrollment shares.
39
We calculated high school completion rates from data published in US Department of Commerce (1963) and
downloaded from the National Historical Geographic Information System (Minnesota Population Center 2004).
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these estimates to those from studies that estimate the impacts of school spending
for more recent cohorts, because such studies tend to measure achievement with
test scores. Even comparing our findings to those for earlier cohorts is difficult:
while most existing studies of earlier cohorts measure achievement with educational
attainment, they also tend to measure school inputs directly (i.e., with pupil-teacher
ratios), instead of with spending.40
We can think about the magnitudes of the estimates in several ways. First, a backof-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis focusing solely on labor market returns to an
additional year of schooling for whites implies that the value of the social benefits
was larger than the spending increase (see online Appendix B for details). Second,
the point estimate for whites implies that Title I can explain 37 percent of the 10 percentage point decrease in their high school dropout rate over the decade. By contrast, using the 95 percent confidence interval, we estimate that Title I can account
for at most 24 percent of the 14 percentage point decrease in black high school
dropout over the 1960s.41
B. Evidence on Within-District Allocation
Our estimates suggest that whites benefited from Title I-induced changes in educational expenditure, but blacks did not. The estimates are imprecise enough that we
cannot reject moderate beneficial effects for blacks, but we reject that the effects are
the same for the two groups.
One possible explanation for these findings is that Title I-induced spending
increases were disproportionately directed toward whites. Because race-specific
spending data are not available, we cannot directly examine to what extent withindistrict allocations of Title I funds targeted white students. And our analysis of
changes in race-specific pupil-teacher ratios before and after Title I for the two states
where data was available was uninformative. However, our analysis of changes in
overall pupil-teacher ratios between 1964 and 1969 for five states in our estimation
sample implies that Title I-induced reductions in pupil-teacher ratios can account
for 36 to 40 percent of the spending increase.42 Given the strong link between pupilteacher ratios and black educational attainment in slightly earlier cohorts (e.g., Card
See, for example, Card and Krueger (1992a, 1992b, 1996) and Ashenfelter, Collins, and Yoon (2006). Such
studies find positive effects of inputs on educational attainment and wages. Reber (2010) estimates the effects
of desegregation-induced changes in spending on educational attainment for blacks and finds somewhat smaller
effects. Existing work estimating the effects of educational spending tends to use test scores as the educational
outcome of interest (Hanushek 1997).
41
These calculations scale up the coefficient on the change in per-pupil funding (or its upper bound) in the baseline specification of panel A of Table 7 by the predicted change in per-pupil spending from Title I for the average
child, then divide by the (weighted) mean of the dependent variable. The predicted change in per-pupil spending
from Title I is calculated separately by race, weighting by the 1960 race-specific population of 18–19-year-olds and
controlling for their high school dropout rate. We focus on the panel A estimates because they are more precise.
42
The states with pupil-teacher ratio data are Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia. Using the
same specification as in Table 3, we estimate a positive and statistically significant coefficient on child poverty for
the change in teacher-pupil ratios (0.00518 (0.00130)). Given average teacher salaries in these states in 1964 and
1969 ($36,423 and $43,617, respectively, in real 2009 US dollars) and the corresponding coefficient estimate on
child poverty for the change in per-pupil current expenditure in this sample ($561.6), these estimates imply that
reductions in pupil-teacher ratios can account for about 36 to 40 percent of the spending increase induced by Title I.
40

VOL. 5 NO. 3

CASCIO ET AL.: LOCAL RESPONSES TO FEDERAL GRANTS

155

and Krueger 1992a), we expect blacks would have benefited from these reductions
in pupil-teacher ratios had they actually experienced them.
Moreover, targeting of Title I-induced spending increases toward whites was plausible. Substantial desegregation occurred only after 1968,43 making it possible for
districts to continue directing resources to white schools as they had historically done
(Margo 1990). Targeting of Title I funds was also weak at the time, as discussed in
Section I. Martin and McClure (1969) present many examples of districts using funds
in schools not designated as Title I recipients.44 But such blatant misuses of funds
identified as Title I are only one way in which non-Title I schools could benefit from
the program. More easily and without violating any laws or regulations at the time,
districts could have allocated more state and locally generated revenue to non-Title I
schools, using Title I funds “correctly” in Title I schools. Martin and McClure’s
(1969) documentation of such behavior lent political pressure for the increased regulation of the use of Title I funds starting with the 1969 ESEA amendments.
VI. Conclusion

This paper examines the fiscal and educational impacts of the introduction of
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the South. Combining
variation in the program’s intensity across school districts with the timing of its
introduction in 1965, we find evidence of an important role for Title I in increasing
the progressivity of spending on southern schools during the 1960s. School districts
responded to the influx of Title I funding by significantly reducing their own fiscal effort, and more so where Title I grants were small relative to what local revenue would have been had pre-ESEA trends continued. “Money mattered,” but only
where the introduction of Title I increased spending, and only for whites.45 Despite
this, the program appears to have been cost-effective overall in the South on the
basis of our estimates.
Our analysis contributes to understanding of the impact of Title I in its earliest years, but necessarily falls short of a full assessment of Title I’s legacy. The
introduction of Title I likely also had other benefits—on other educational or social
outcomes, on other cohorts, and through the increased consumption of other goods
that crowd-out represents—that are not easily quantified. The effects of Title I’s
43

A growing literature examining the effects of policy efforts to narrow black-white school quality gaps and to
desegregate schools consistently concludes that such programs were beneficial for black educational attainment.
See, for example, Reber (2010); Johnson (2011); Card and Krueger (1992a); Lutz (2011); Ashenfelter, Collins, and
Yoon (2006); and Guryan (2004). Similar to Reber (2010) and consistent with the idea that desegregation-induced
spending helped blacks, we find that spending and educational attainment for blacks both increased more in districts
with higher black enrollment shares.
44
For example: “In Oxford, Mississippi, a curriculum and materials center is located at a non-Title I school,
near a police station, reportedly for fear of burglary. Furthermore, the Title I coordinator in Oxford is principal of
a non-Title I, white school” (Martin and McClure 1969, 6). An HEW audit of Louisiana school districts covering
Title I expenditures in the program’s first year found that 23 counties “loaned” equipment costing $645,624 to
schools that were ineligible to participate in Title I programs. The auditors noted that much of the “loaned” equipment was “set in concrete or fastened to the plumbing” (Martin and McClure 1969, 9).
45
Our findings are in contrast to the existing literature on Title I, which has concluded that the program is largely
ineffective. However, we ask a different question by estimating returns to increases in education spending induced
by Title I for all students in a district, rather than comparing outcomes of participants in whatever was called a Title I
program at a particular point in time to those for nonparticipants (as in Carter 1984; Puma et al. 1997).
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introduction might well have been different outside of the South. These questions
are important ones for future research.
Our analysis also makes a more general point. In the same vein as Baicker and
Staiger’s (2005) analysis of Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital funding and
van der Klaauw’s (2008) school-level analysis of Title I programs in New York City,
our findings emphasize the usefulness of examining the impacts of intergovernmental grants on a jurisdiction’s finances alongside any evaluation of their impact on
the ultimate outcome of interest. Indeed, the introduction of Title I improved educational attainment only where it increased education spending.
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